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MENTAL ILLNESS AND LONG-TERM DISABILITY
PLANS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Stephen F. Befortt
One of the most difficult issues under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA),' concerns the status of employer-provided long-term
disability plans. These plans typically afford longer periods of benefit
eligibility to individuals who are physically, as opposed to mentally,
disabled. Numerous lawsuits have challenged this distinction as violative
of the ADA's ban on disability-based discrimination. Thus far, the
judiciary's response to these lawsuits has been far from uniform.
One of the factors contributing to this current state of confusion is the
ADA's lack of detail with respect to the treatment of disability plans. An
equally important factor is the complexity of this issue in terms of the
ADA's overall regulatory scheme. This complexity is demonstrated by the
fact that courts must address at least four separate sub-issues in order to
determine the validity of the mental/physical distinction in disability plans.
These sub-issues are as follows:
1. Does a fully disabled former employee have standing to sue his or
her ex-employer under Title I of the ADA?
2. May a former employee bring suit against an insurance provider of
a long-term disability benefit policy under Title III of the ADA?
3. Do distinctions between mental and physical disabilities constitute
discrimination within the meaning of the ADA?
4. What type of showing must be made to establish that a coverage
distinction in a disability plan is not a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of
the ADA?
The resolution of these sub-issues requires the courts to grapple not
only with thorny questions of statutory interpretation, but also with
significant policy concerns that go to the heart of the ADA's objectives.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the structure and
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Deidre
McGrath for excellent research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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purposes of long-term disability plans. Part II reviews the competing
policy considerations concerning the prevalent disparate treatment of
mental and physical disabilities under these plans. Part I then analyzes
the judiciary's treatment of each of the four legal sub-issues noted above.
Finally, Part IV provides a critique and proposes a resolution of the
disability plan conundrum.
I. INTRODUCTION TO DISABILITY BENEFIT PLANS
A disability benefit plan provides income-replacement benefits to
employees who are unable to work because of illness or accident.2 The
purpose of such an insurance plan, which may be either employer-
ponsored3 or privately purchased, is to replace some or all of the income
lost while an employee is suffering from a disability. Therefore, the
amount of disability income an employee collects depends on his or her
pre-disability income level and not on the type or severity of the disability
suffered.4 This wage replacement characteristic makes disability benefits
different from medical benefits, which are used to reimburse employees for
expenses associated with medical services.5 Disability plans also differ
from medical or health plans in that they typically provide benefits only for
individuals who become totally disabled and unable to work.6
Employer-sponsored disability insurance plans may be either short-
term or long-term in nature. Under a short-term plan, an employee receives
a portion of his or her regular wages for a specified period of disability
generally not to exceed twenty-six weeks.7 Long-term benefit coverage
8
usually starts after short-term disability income benefits cease. Long-term
plans provide a partial income-replacement benefit to employees who are
not likely to return to work because of the total and/or permanent nature of
their disabilities. This latter type of plan frequently provides for the offset
of other disability or retirement-type benefits, such as those provided under
Social Security and private pension plans.9
A common characteristic of long-term disability plans is their different
2. CYNTHIA M. COMBE & GERALD J. TALBOT, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ANSWER BOOK §
10:1 (3d ed. 1994).
3. An employer may choose to provide such a benefit through the purchase of a
commercially available insurance policy or through a self-insured arrangement.
4. See COMBE & TALBOT, supra note 2, § 10:4.
5. See Charles B. Lynch, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Disability Benefit
Plans, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 561, 570 (1998).
6. See Frank J. Rief, III, Disability Insurance: If You Have Not Considered It, You Are
Better Off Dead!, C472 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 1151, 1176 (1990).
7. See Combe & Talbot, supra note 2, § 10:4.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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treatment of mental and physical disabilities. Most employer-sponsored
plans limit eligibility for employees who are totally disabled due to a
mental condition to a term of twenty-four months or less. 10 By contrast,
individuals with a physical disability typically remain eligible under such
plans until age sixty-five." As a result of this distinction, employees who
become seriously disabled because of physical causes likely will receive a
far greater amount of benefits than those employees who suffer from
mental or nervous disabilities.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE MENTAL/PHYSICAL DISTINCTION
A. Justifying the Distinction
Defenders of the differentiation in coverage levels for mental and
physical disabilities cite arguments for cost control along with a general
distrust of mental illness diagnoses to justify their stance. 12 As one
commentator has summarized, "both the need to keep premiums affordable
and the perception that diagnosis and treatment of mental health is less
reliable and effective than treatment of 'regular' physical medical care are
the primary reasons for the commonality of these limitations [on mental
disability coverage]. 13
Advocates of the status quo often couch their cost control arguments
in terms of "risk justification." The argument has been described as
follows:
Insurers generally make coverage distinctions and exclusions for
purposes of risk classification. They seek out information on
insurance applications to determine who is at high risk for
developing certain illnesses that may be very costly to cover. By
declining to cover those illnesses, or covering them only up to a
very low amount, insurers can hold down costs and presumably
maintain premium levels for other insureds.1
4
From this vantage-point, coverage limitations on costly mental
conditions serve the greater good of enabling a higher degree of coverage
10. See Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of
Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefits Plans, 50 BAYLOR L.
Rnv. 361,362 (1998).
11. See id.
12. See Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative "Subterfuge"?: Failing to Insure Persons
with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 50 VAND. L. REv. 753,755-56 (1997).
13. Id.
14. Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing With Our Minds: The Mental Illness
Limitation in Health Insurance, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 345, 359-60 (1996).
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for more common physical disorders.
Two other related cost-based arguments are grounded in the concepts
of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection." The basic premise of moral
hazard is that, as insurance providers increase coverage for services, the
demand for those services also will increase even though the same
individuals, if uninsured, might not opt for such services at their own
expense.' 5 According to some, this concern is particularly troublesome
with respect to mental conditions because some individuals "might claim to
suffer from an illness when they are actually suffering from life." 16 With
regard to adverse selection, employers and insurers are concerned that
increased mental health coverage will result in many high risk enrollees,
thereby raising costs and necessitating either a reduction in overall
coverage or an increase in premiums.17
The other argument against parity centers around a general widespread
suspicion of mental illness and of mental health treatments in particular.
Mental disorders tend to be more subjective in nature and more difficult to
define than physical disorders with visible manifestations." Some view
treatments for mental and nervous conditions as less effective, void of
definite, predictable results and capable of continuing for years without
substantial improvement in the employee's condition.' 9 Although mental
disabilities may not be as common as physical disabilities, the higher level
of severity associated with the former suggests to some "that there is a
qualitative difference between mental/nervous disorders and physical
disorders that warrants treating them separately for insurance purposes. 2 °
B. Arguments for Parity
Supporters of parity between mental and physical disability coverage
are quick to dismiss the above arguments as based on biased attitudes and
outdated stigmas concerning mental disabilities. Indeed, some mental
health advocates have referred to these limitations as "the last bastion of
open discrimination in health insurance in this country."2'
15. See Barry Blackwell, No Margin, No Mission, 271 JAMA 1466 (1994).
16. James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining "Medical Necessity" in Mental
Health Practice, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 9-10 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
17. See Jeffrey Rubin, Financing Mental Health Care, 28 Hous. L. REV. 143, 157
(1991).
18. See Allan P. Blostin, Mental Health Benefits Financed by Employers, 110
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 23 (July 1987).
19. See Cook, supra note 14, at 346, 360.
20. Allison C. Blakley, Is Depression Disabling America's Group Insurance Plans?
Mental Health Benefit Parity and the ADA, 27 A.B.A. BRIEF 40, 45 (Summer 1998),
available in WESTLAW, 27-SUM Brief 40.
21. Insurance Regulation: CBO Analysis Doesn't Tell Full Story on Mental Health
Parity, Coalition Says, 4 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 908 (May 27, 1996) (quoting a
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Advocates for change point to medical research that increasingly
shows that many mental disorders have identifiable biological origins. This
research purportedly establishes that mental illness such as bipolar disorder
and severe depression can be traced to measurable physiological effects on
the brain.22 Citing to this research, the Director of the National Institute on
Mental Health testified to a House Subcommittee that no biomedical
justification exists for assuming that mental diseases are in any way less
real or less deserving of treatment than physical diseases.2
This research also calls into question the notion that mental illness is
different because it is less susceptible to successful treatment. According
to some commentators, many classic mental illnesses such as schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder are highly treatable conditions that respond well to
therapy when conducted in tandem with appropriate levels of medication.24
Supporters of parity acknowledge that equal treatment will result in
higher costs, although the exact economic impact is difficult to predict.
They point out, however, that the current limitation on coverage of
treatment for mental disabilities is not based upon true risk classification
analysis. Instead of comparing economic risk data for both mental and
physical disabilities, the current practice simply imposes a blanket
exclusion of coverage for all mental disabilities after a certain period of
time.2 After reviewing the various arguments for and against equality of
treatment, one supporter of parity concluded that "[t]he only distinction at
this point seems to be between one group of insureds whose illnesses
manifest themselves in socially stigmatized ways and another group of
insureds whose illnesses are more acceptable as physical injury or
disease.' 26
C. The Mental Health Parity Act
In 1996, Congress responded to one aspect of the parity debate. The
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA) amended the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Public Health
Services Act to require uniformity in the application of certain limits on
press release by the Coalition for Fairness in Mental illness Coverage).
22. See Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too-The Case for Equal Insurance
Coveragefor Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 365, 367-69 (1993).
23. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. &
Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of
Dr. Stephen Hyman, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.).
24. See Shannon, supra note 22, at 367-70.
25. See Cook, supra note 14, at 359-60.
26. Id. at 360.
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mental health benefits. 27 More specifically, the MHPA provides for parity
in the aggregate lifetime and annual limits for mental and medical/surgical
benefits if a group health plan includes such limits. 28  Despite this
requirement, the statute is not a mandate for mental health coverage.29 The
MHPA contains no mandate with respect to the terms and conditions of
insurance plans. In addition, the MHPA permits limits on the amount,
duration, and scope of mental health benefits under an insurance plan.3 °
Parity, accordingly, is only required in aggregate lifetime and annual
benefits, and even then is required only if the employer or insurer has
voluntarily chosen to provide mental health benefits.
The MHPA represents a legislative attempt to address and partially
correct insurance coverage disparities between mental and physical
disabilities. It is important to note, however, that the MHPA applies only
to health and medical insurance coverage, and not to disability plans.31
Thus, the prevailing policy of distinguishing between mental and physical
illness in long-term disability benefit plans is not affected by the MHPA,
and its continuing validity must be tested under the ADA.
II. THE LEGAL ISSUE UNDER THE ADA
As noted above, the ADA's treatment of the mental/physical
distinction with respect to eligibility for long-term disability benefits
depends on the judiciary's response to four unsettled sub-issues. Each of
these sub-issues is discussed below.
A. Does a Fully Disabled Former Employee Have Standing to Sue His or
Her Ex-employer Under Title I of the ADA?
Title I of the ADA generally prohibits disability discrimination in the
employment relationship.32 In order to have standing to challenge an
employer-provided disability insurance policy as discriminatory under the
ADA, a plaintiff must be a "qualified individual with a disability."33 Title I
27. See Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a
and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5) (Supp. II 1996).
28. See The Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1)-(2) (West
1996).
29. See id. § 1185a(b)(1).
30. See id. § 1185a(b)(2).
31. See id. § 1185a(a)(1)-(2); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-882, at 356 (1997)
(describing the MHPA as dealing with parity in mental health services, as opposed to in
disability benefits).
32. See generally The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117 (1994).
33. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
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of the ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a person
who can perform the essential functions of his or her position with or
without reasonable accommodation. 34
Neither the EEOC regulations nor the interpretive guidance address
the standing issue. In litigation, the EEOC has taken the following
position:
the relevant "employment position" in any case involving post-
employment fringe benefits, is the position actually occupied by
plaintiff, that of benefit recipient, and that as long as the plaintiff
satisfies any non-discriminatory eligibility criteria for receipt of
benefits, he is a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the
ADA.35
According to the EEOC, therefore, a former employee has standing to
sue under the ADA so long as he or she is qualified to receive benefits.
A number of courts have held that a former employee who is fully
disabled and receiving disability benefits lacks standing to bring suit under
Title I of the ADA.36 According to these courts, the former employee is not
a "qualified individual with a disability" because he or she can no longer
perform the essential functions of the former job.37 Because only fully
disabled individuals qualify for disability benefits, this interpretation has
been criticized as effectively preventing any benefits recipient from ever
challenging an employer's provision of disability benefits on grounds of
discrimination."
As noted above, the EEOC attempts to avoid this result by asserting
that the relevant "employment position" for which a plaintiff may be a
"qualified individual" is that of a benefits recipient."a This approach goes
to the opposite extreme and automatically confers standing on a former
employee who is a beneficiary under a disability benefit policy. The
Seventh Circuit has criticized the EEOC's interpretation, in turn, on the
grounds that an "employment position" necessarily refers to a job, not
simply the task of collecting benefit checks.4° Thus far, no court has
adopted the EEOC's position.
A recent decision in the Third Circuit, Ford v. Schering-Plough
34. See42U.S.C.§ 12111(8).
35. Leonard v. Israel Discount Bank, No. 95 Civ. 6964, 1996 WL 634860, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1996).
36. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner
Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (1lth Cir. 1996); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875
F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir.
1996),judgment vacated, 107 F.3d 359, reh'g en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
37. See Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1326. See also CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1043-45.
38. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-63 (E.D. Va. 1997).
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40. See CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1043-44.
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Corp.,41 sanctioned the result sought by the EEOC, but on different
grounds. The Ford court borrowed from a 1997 Supreme Court decision
that authorized former employees to bring suit under Title VII for post-
employment retaliation.42 The Third Circuit extended this principle to the
ADA and held that former employees may also sue their former employer
for disability-based discrimination based on the manner in which the
former employer provides post-employment benefits.43
Some courts have opted for an interpretation somewhere between the
extremes of the above-mentioned approaches. In Lewis v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co.,44 the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the standing issue should be determined with reference to the
plaintiff's status at the time that he or she was offered the allegedly
discriminatory disability insurance plan. In that case, the court ruled that
an employee who was partially disabled, yet qualified to perform the duties
of the job at the time that he was offered the disability plan, had a vested
right to challenge the plan even though he was fully disabled at the time of
bringing suit.45 The Lewis court left open the question of whether a person
who was not yet disabled at the time the plan was offered would have the
same vested right. Another district court refused to dismiss a former
employee's challenge to a disability plan, but held that the claim was only
viable for the period before the plaintiff became fully disabled.46
B. May a Former Employee Bring Suit Against an Insurance Provider
Under Title I1 As a Public Accommodation?
Title III of the ADA states that "[no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. ' 47 Among the
entities listed as a public accommodation for purposes of Title Im is an
"insurance office."' 8 On the other hand, Title V of the ADA contains a safe
harbor provision that insulates insurance providers from liability when
"underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are
based on or not inconsistent with State law."49
41. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
42. See id. at 606-08 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)).
43. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 607-08.
44. 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997).
45. See id. at 1162-63.
46. See Esfahani v. Medical College of Pa., 919 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
48. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
49. Id. § 12201(c)(1).
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) has adopted regulations interpreting
Title III of the ADA. These regulations define a "place of public
accommodation" as a "facility operated by a private entity."50  The
regulations then define a "facility" as "all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites.... ,,5 The DOJ Technical Assistance manual states that
"insurance offices are places of public accommodation and, as such, may
not discriminate on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts
or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts they offer."
52
An individual may bring an action against an insurance provider under
Title I only if the disability insurance policy is a good or service provided
by a place of public accommodation.53 Some courts have held that the term
"public accommodation" encompasses only physical places and
structures.54 They base this conclusion on the fact that the entities listed as
"public accommodations" in the statute are primarily physical places open
to public access. 55  The Sixth Circuit, in Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.,56 for example, while admitting that an "insurance office" is
a place of public accommodation, ruled that an employee who had obtained
a disability plan through her employer did not have a necessary physical
nexus with an insurance office.57 That court further held that Title Ill only
regulates the accessibility to a place of public accommodation and not the
contents of those goods and services offered by a public accommodation."
Several other courts have concluded that Title I reaches the sale or
provision of insurance policies and have allowed actions against insurers to
go forward on that basis.59 These courts do not require a physical nexus
between a plaintiff and an insurance office, arguing that such a holding
would lead to the absurd result that those people entering an office would
be protected while those people who merely transact business over the
50. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
51. Id.
52. DEPARTmENT OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DIsABiLITIEs ACT TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § 1II-3.1 1000.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
54. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n,
861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
55. See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014.
56. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
57. See id. at 1010, 1014.
58. See id. at 1012.
59. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994); Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998);
Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins., 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997); World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966
F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
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phone or internet would not.60 Some of these courts rely, in part, on the
fact that neither the statute nor the regulations expressly limit covered
public accommodations to physical places.6' Finally, some of these courts
also find that the inclusion of the safe harbor provision regarding insurance
providers illustrates that the ADA was intended to cover the contents of
insurance plans and not just access to insurance offices. 62
C. Do Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Disabilities Constitute
Discrimination Within the Meaning of the ADA?
The ADA states that no covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability with respect to "job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."63  The ADA's discrimination ban extends to contractual
arrangements which have the effect of subjecting an employer's disabled
employees to discrimination. 4
The EEOC regulations state that the ADA bars discrimination on the
basis of disability with regard to fringe benefits whether or not they are
administered by the employer.65 In a 1993 Interim Enforcement Guidance,
the EEOC took the position that distinctions between mental and physical
disabilities in terms of insurance coverage do not constitute actionable
disability-based discrimination for purposes of the ADA.66 Although the
EEOC has not withdrawn this Guidance, it does not appear to adhere to this
position at present.67
In Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,61 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held that the ADA prohibits disability
insurance policies from providing different benefit levels for mental as
opposed to physical disabilities unless the distinction in treatment is
grounded in sound actuarial data. The court acknowledged that the
distinction occurring in the Lewis context was between individuals with
different types of disabilities, as opposed to the more typical scenario in
60. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution, 37 F.3d at 19; Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
61. See, e.g., Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1164.
62. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution, 37 F.3d at 20.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
64. See id. § 12112(b)(2).
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(0 (1998).
66. See Application of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 to Disability-Based
Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
405:7120 (June 8, 1993) (citing EEOC, Interim Enforcement Guidance on Application of
ADA to Health Insurance).
67. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 n. 9. (E.D. Va. 1997)
68. Id. at 1158.
MENTAL ILLNESS AND LONG-TERM DISABILITY
which the challenged distinction is between individuals who are disabled
and individuals who are not disabled. The court stressed that the former
type of distinction is nonetheless violative of the ADA so long as the
resulting discrimination occurs because of an individual's particular
69disability status.
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue have reached a
different conclusion.70 Once again, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.7' is a leading example of those court
decisions which have denied liability. In Parker, the court stated that
"[t]he ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different
disabilities. Rather, the ADA [only] prohibits discrimination between the
disabled and the non-disabled. 72  The Parker court explained that
disability plans with benefit levels that differentiate between those with
mental and physical disabilities do not offend the ADA because all
employees subject to such a policy, whether disabled or non-disabled,
receive the same access to the plan.73
The Third Circuit, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. ,74 agreed with
Parker and pointed to two pieces of legislative history in further support of
that conclusion.75 First, the Ford court cited to a pre-enactment Senate
report 76 that took the position that the proposed legislation, while requiring
that individuals with disabilities must have equal access to health insurance
coverage, would not require identical benefit levels for all disabling
conditions.77 The Ford decision also looked to Congress' defeat of an
amendment to the Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996,7s that would
have mandated parity in insurance coverage for mental and physical
illnesses.79 The Ford court noted that "[s]uch an amendment would have
been unnecessary altogether if the ADA already required such parity."'
69. See id. at 1168-69.
70. See, e.g., Rogers v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999);
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir.
1996); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Moddemo v. King,
82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act).
71. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1006.
72. Id. at 1015.
73. See id. at 1015-16.
74. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
75. See id. at 601.
76. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 29 (1989).
77. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
78. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
79. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
80. Id.
2971999]
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D. What Type of Showing Must Be Made to Establish That a Coverage
Distinction in a Disability Plan Is Not a "Subterfuge" to Evade the
Purposes of the ADA?
The ADA expressly affords insurance providers a safe harbor to
underwrite, classify, or administer risks in a manner consistent with state
law. 1 Providers may not do so, however, as a "subterfuge" to evade the
anti-discrimination purposes of the statute.'2 The ADA nevertheless does
not define or describe the meaning of the term "subterfuge."
The EEOC's Interim Enforcement Guidance states that the term
"subterfuge" refers to a "disability-based disparate treatment that is not
justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability." 3 According to
the Guidance, a defendant can establish that a distinction is not a subterfuge
in a number of ways, such as by providing proof that "the disparate
treatment is justified by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably
anticipated experience."' 4
Only a handful of reported cases have reached the "subterfuge" issue.
So far, these decisions have adopted two divergent views of this exception
to the ADA's insurance safe harbor provision.
The more restrictive interpretation of the "subterfuge" exception
builds upon the Supreme Court's prior construction of a similar provision
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In Public
Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 5 the Court ruled that an employer's
differential treatment of employees on the basis of age in structuring a
benefit plan was not a discriminatory subterfuge unless such action was
designed to discriminate "in some non-fringe benefit aspect of the
employment relation." 86 Under the Betts analysis, the subterfuge issue
becomes part of the plaintiff's prima facie case of establishing
discrimination, rather than a cost-based defense borne by the employer.8 7
At least two circuit courts have used the Betts approach in interpreting
the ADA's subterfuge provision.88 Although Congress subsequently
amended the ADEA to overturn Betts,89 these decisions point out that
Congress was aware of the still-controlling Betts interpretation at the time it
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (1994).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
83. Interim Enforcement Guidance, supra note 66.
84. Id.
85. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
86. Id. at 181.
87. See id. at 181-82.
88. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978, Title I, § 103 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1994)).
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adopted the ADA.90 Accordingly, both courts concluded that Congress
would have used different language in the ADA if Congress had intended
the subterfuge exception to have a meaning different from that of the Betts
decision.91
In short, these circuit court decisions adopted a restrictive view of the
subterfuge exception which, in turn, recognizes a broad safe harbor for
insurance-based distinctions in benefit plans. These cases rejected the
EEOC's position and held that the subterfuge exception is implicated only
if a plaintiff can establish that an employer intentionally structured a
benefit plan so as to discriminate in some non-benefit aspect of
employment.
In contrast, a Virginia district court has expressly adopted the EEOC's
position and ruled that the subterfuge exception permits an employer to
provide different benefit levels for individuals with mental disabilities, as
opposed to physical disabilities, only if the classification "is grounded on
sound actuarial principles or other competent factual basis. 92 In reaching
this conclusion, the Lewis I court relied, in part, on other decisions finding
unlawful insurance plan distinctions that have the effect of either denying
coverage or providing inferior coverage on the basis of a particular
disability in the absence of actuarial justification.93 In a subsequent opinion
following a bench trial, the court concluded that the disability plan in
question was invalid because the employer failed to justify the distinction
in benefit coverage by actuarial data or any other type of cost analysis.
94
The two Lewis decisions rely heavily on legislative history in their
analysis. In Lewis I, the court cited a House Report that explained the
reach of the safe harbor provision as follows:
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the
plan may not refuse to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind
of coverage available... solely because of a physical or mental
impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate
differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to
actual or reasonably anticipated experience.95
90. See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679; Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065.
91. See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679; Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065.
92. Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1169 (E.D. Va. 1997) [hereinafter
Lewis I].
93. See id. at 1166-68 (referring to Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp.
299 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.H. 1996); and
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997)).
94. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Va. 1998)
[hereinafter Lewis 11].
95. Lewis 1, 982 F. Supp. at 1166 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-45, pt. 2, at 136-37
(1990)).
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The Lewis II court used legislative history to support its conclusion
that Congress expressly declined to follow the Betts decision in enacting
the ADA:
The term "subterfuge" is used in the ADA simply to denote a
means of evading the purposes of the ADA. It does not mean
that there must be some malicious intent on the part of the
insurance company or other organization, nor does it mean that a
plan is automatically shielded because it was put into place
before the ADA was passed. Indeed, there is currently a bill
moving through Congress to overturn the Betts decision and we
have no intention of repeating a decision with which we do not
96agree.
Using this legislative history, the two Lewis decisions read the ADA's
subterfuge provision as imposing an evidentiary burden on insurance
providers to justify disability-based plan distinctions with concrete
financial data.
IV. CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATION
The current state of confusion regarding the legal status of long-term
disability plans is not surprising, considering the significant policy and
legal issues at stake. The relevant policy concerns go beyond the typical
tug-of-war between disabled workers and entrepreneurial owners and call
into question society's long-held beliefs respecting the comparative
worthiness of those suffering from mental, as opposed to physical,
disabilities. The four legal sub-issues implicated by the mental/physical
distinction in disability plans place the ADA's text, the EEOC's
interpretive guidance, and the pertinent legislative history in a battle royale
for the true meaning of the ADA. Given the complexity and importance of
these issues, the disability plan debate likely will continue for many years
in the absence of Congressional intervention.
While these issues are admittedly difficult, they are not without
solutions. This article recommends the following interpretation of the
ADA as a desirable path out of the current thicket.
First, courts should follow the Third Circuit's decision in Ford97 and
hold that disabled former employees have standing under Title I to
challenge disability plan distinctions. The competing line of cases holding
that a fully disabled employee lacks standing because he or she is no longer
a "qualified" employee creates a "catch-22" dilemma where employees
96. Lewis H1, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 (quoting 136 CoNG. REc. H4624 (daily ed. May
17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
97. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussed supra at
notes 41-43 and accompanying text).
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who are qualified to receive benefits can never be qualified to challenge the
benefit plan as discriminatory. The Ford decision appropriately avoids the
complications of determining when and for what purpose an individual is
"qualified" by simply extending the ADA's reach to include former
employees in a manner similar to that recognized under Title VII.
On the other hand, the courts should not stretch Title III of the ADA to
find that insurance providers are public accommodations and thus are
automatically subject to suit. The plain language of Title III protects
disabled individuals who seek access to places of accommodation as
physical structures." An insurance policy is neither a place nor a structure.
If Congress had intended to make the much larger leap in Title I to
prohibiting discrimination in the provision of all goods and services, it
likely would have said so more explicitly.
This reading of Title III is not as harsh as one might initially suspect.
Title I's discrimination ban extends to contractual arrangements which
discriminate against disabled employees. 99 Thus, even if an insurance
provider is not directly subject to suit under the suggested reading of Title
UT, its discriminatory practices are still subject to challenge in a Title I suit
directed at the beneficiary's former employer.
Finally, the judiciary should follow the lead of the Lewis decisions in
resolving the two remaining issues. In Lewis 1, the U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of Virginia ruled that the ADA bans discrimination
between individuals with different disabilities so long as the discrimination
occurs because of an individual's particular disability.'0 This
determination runs counter to the current majority line of cases that limit
the ADA's prohibition to conduct that discriminates between the disabled
and the non-disabled. While the majority reading is plausible, the Lewis I
approach better comports with the ADA's goal of eradicating
discrimination based on "stereotypic assumptions" about the disabled.' ° '
As noted above, individuals with mental disabilities have long suffered
from others' biased attitudes and outdated stigmas.1°2  The ADA,
accordingly, should be interpreted so as to prohibit an employer from
acting on such stereotypical assumptions to the detriment of individuals
with mental disabilities, regardless of whether the benefited comparison
group consists of other disabled or nondisabled individuals.
Both Lewis I and Lewis H construe the ADA's subterfuge provision as
imposing a cost-based justification defense on employers rather than as an
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining "public accommodation").
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
100. Lewis I, 982 F. Supp. at 1169.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), (b)(1).
102. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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additional element of the plaintiffs prima facie case.103 This interpretation
is both rational and consistent with the weight of legislative history.
In terms of rationality, the subterfuge provision, in conjunction with
the remainder of the insurance safe harbor, serves much the same purpose
as the business necessity defense in disparate impact litigation. Under Title
VII, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie disparate impact case if he or
she shows that an employer's employment practice disproportionately
disadvantaged members of a protected class. 14 The employer, nonetheless,
may avoid liability (and continue the practice) if it establishes that the
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.'05
The subterfuge provision as construed by the Lewis decisions operates
in much the same fashion. The ADA bans discrimination in the provision
of employment benefits but establishes a safe harbor for insurance-based
distinctions resulting from traditional risk classification. The subterfuge
provision insulates an employer or insurance provider from liability to the
extent that the distinction actually serves the legitimate business purpose of
risk classification. As in the disparate impact context, the practice in
question is saved to the extent that legitimate business needs are
established. As noted in the legislative history, this need is verified in the
subterfuge context if the employer shows that "the standards used are based
on sound actuarial data and not on speculation."'
10 6
The question remains as to the appropriate height of this cost-
justification hurdle. At a minimum, the purpose of the subterfuge provision
requires that an insurance provider justify a disability-related distinction in
benefit eligibility by generally acceptable risk classification data. On the
other hand, this requirement should not be so burdensome as to invalidate
distinctions that generally correlate with demonstrated risk factors, but
which are not established with dollar-for-dollar mathematical precision.
V. CONCLUSION
The prevalent mental/physical distinction in long-term disability plans
raises many difficult policy and legal issues under the ADA. The ultimate
resolution of these issues may take a number of years to unfold. This
article attempts to identify these issues and suggests one possible blueprint
for interpreting the ADA. This effort hopefully will contribute toward a
resolution of this subject that appropriately considers and balances the
many important issues at stake.
103. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
106. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70 (1990).
